Winnipeg Free Press

Winnipeg Free Press (Newspaper) - July 17, 1973, Winnipeg, Manitoba Winnipeg free press. Tuesday. July 17, 197s by George w. Ball or. Brezhnev has come and gone and As a result americans feel easier in their minds about the soviet Union. That is the typical Impact of Summit meetings on a democracy where there is no censorship and the doors mid windows Are fully open. Sum Mitry the key to finding peace focus americans who like to like people find it particularly hard to focus on Stern conflicts of National interest and policy when leaders appear in flesh and blood or on Tele vision screens in living color and because politicians by definition know How to ingratiate themselves with the Public distorted perceptions often result. We should not forget for example that when photographed with Roosevelt and Churchill at a succession of Summit meetings Stalin became lovable Uncle despite the fact that he was one of the bloodiest tyrants in history or that while touring the . 14 years ago Khrushchev appeared As a genial and boisterous Char Acter scarcely the kind of fellow one would expect to build the Berlin Wall smug Gle missiles into Cuba or Send tanks to suppress the flowering of Freedom first in Poland and then Hungary. Now the same magic has worked for Leonid Brezhnev who gave his Nartic to the doctrine that sanctioned the despoiling of the Brief Prague Spring. If the american peo ple did not go wild with enthusiasm when he Cavor Ted in the nation s capital it was because they had other things on their mind any Way the soviet people thought they had. That was the message sent Back to Moscow jamming of the voice of America was even halted for three hours so the russian Public could hear their master s voice. Thus everyone thought the visit a great Success and to appraise it primarily in pub Lic relations terms is neither flip nor inappropriate since that is what both or. Nixon and or. Brezhnev had principally in mind. Each had compelling motives for wish ing to create an atmosphere of Friendship and Good feel ing. Or. Nixon needed to Dis tract attention from water Gate and a burnish the image of the president As statesman. He largely succeeded for a solid week. Or. Brezhnev sought a visual demonstration of soviet american Friendship for More Complex reasons. Chief among them is the russian obsession with China com pounded of history and Geog Raphy. The most frightful invasions of the past have come from the East fierce armies sweeping across the open Steppes of today a hostile China stirs vestigial anxieties. How can the Kremlin keep the disparate parts of the .s.r. Together when there Are Only slavic Peoples in the whole soviet Union East of the urals. It is an area twice As Large As the United states an almost empty con t i n e n t next door to the chinese 90 per a Cal of the total population who live in the Eastern third of China that is no larger than Argentina. The awareness that China lays claim to Large chunks of Siberia wrested from her in a time of weakness not Only induces the soviet leadership to maintain men along the Long land Boundary but gives logic to a detente with the West that would avoid the Nightmare danger of an attack on two fronts. Beyond that however the Kremlin leaders Are clearly upset at the slow Pace of so Viet economic growth As More and More evidence accumulates that their com Mand Economy can never work efficiently without some form of Market mechanism which party ideologies flatly reject. The process of adjust ing Supply to demand is Sim ply too Subtle and intricate for the Central planners. Yet to admit that would be heresy so Hope triumphs Over experience. If they could Only achieve a sufficient leap Forward by acquiring american Machin Ery and particularly Advance computer technology which they see As the key to effective planning could they not then be competitive with the West forlorn though that Hope May be they Are bound by their own Iron doctrine to be Lieve it. Yet Here reality gets in the Way for they must do More than persuade tha american government to per Mit the Sale of such machines and technology they must earn the foreign Exchange to buy them. Thus the emphasis on grandiose deals to develop soviet min eral and Energy resources deals that depend on massive credits from America. Mean while they must continue to buy american wheat until they can improve their inefficient agricultural production through among other things . Help. In addition to increasing total Industrial output or. Brezhnev faces a mounting demand for More consumer goods since it is hardly sur prising that More than half Century after the revolution the Long patient soviet people grow hungry for the elemental men tics enjoyed by the West. Automobiles and washing machines and decent housing must be produced not Only to Check disaffection but As work incentives for soviet labor on the farms and in the factories. Yet that is not a problem to be easily solved for if additional resources arc to be channelled into the consumer sector the Kremlin must be in position to persuade the soldiers and hard Core ideologies doctrinally committed to arms and heavy Industry that the new spirit of detente reduces the danger of War and thus justifies a slow Down in military hardware. These Are the most obvious motives for Brezhnev s ingratiating behaviour but there is also a More Specula Tive explanation. It is that present efforts to butter up the West and particularly the . Do not reflect the abandonment of soviet ambitions for the ultimate Politi Cal domination of Europe. The struggle for Primacy be tween marxism and the lib eral democracies has not come to an end what we arc now witnessing is a change in tactics not in Long Range strategy. What is new is a soviet decision that they can achieve their objectives bet Ter by smiles and seduction than through a Hartline confrontation that has so far got them nowhere. If the West should prove to be weak or foolish or both such a calculation might possibly be Correct. If Atlan tic tics were to be seriously weakened and America led by false complacency into a total withdrawal from Europe if Progress toward european Unity were to be frustrated and Europe left to revert to its ancient pattern of rival nation states if. By the end of this decade communist parties were to be participating in the govern ment of Italy and perhaps one or two other european states if a sense of euphoria pervading the new Post War generation were to Sanction substantial disarmament in Western Europe with Little commensurate scaling Down of military might in Eastern Europe if the attractions of Ost politic were to Lead West Germany to make far reaching deals with Moscow which alone can offer the seductive bait of Reu Ifica and finally if the rus sians were ultimately to get their Industrial machine working with improved of f i c i e n c y thus the soviet Union could emerge As the dominant Industrial and political Power on the Europe an land mass. In that event the individual slates of a fragmented Europe each relatively Small and weak by super Power standards would be sorely tempted to make their separate peace with Moscow on essentially soviet terms. Obviously that is a pessimistic vision of a future it is now fashionable to View in a More hopeful Light. Yet it is an interpretation no Pru Dent government should wholly Rule out in designing its operating hypothesis. For what gives special support to that View is the fact too Little recognized in the . That while the soviet Lead ers have been moderating their vocabulary and smiling at the West they have grown increasingly harsh at Home. Dissent is put Down with a ferocity far greater than in Khrushchev s Day. The out spoken Young historian an Drei am Alrik is now con fined in a siberian prison Camp even after his three year prison term has expired. The Brilliant novelist Solzhenitsyn cannot accept the Nobel prize. Intellectuals Are locked up in insane asylums on spurious medical evidence. But one need not fully accept forecasts of possible disaster that might weaken the Western will and hasten the spread of soviet influence and authority Over Western Europe to perceive in the Kremlin s actions and proposals a line of policy aimed at the achievement of three Clear objectives the first is to secure recognition of the legitimacy of its hold Over Eastern Europe including by implication an acceptance of the so called Brezhnev Doc Trine the doctrine of limited sovereignty that the Kremlin uses to justify armed intervention whenever a Warsaw pact country bets out of line. The soviet Union is Well on the Way to securing this recognition not Only by its treaty with West Germany but through the european Security Confer ence now under Way in Helsinki. The second is to help generate pressures that will induce the United states to withdraw its presence and influence from Europe. That objective will be approaching achievement if and when passes the mans Field Resolution calling for the unilateral scaling Down of . Troop deployments particularly in Germany. Its third objective is to halt Progress toward Europe an Unity since it is Clear that the soviet Hope of Politi Cal dominance Over Europe can be realized Only if West Ern Europe remains a frag meted group of nation states not tied together by common institutions but each pursuing its own line of policy and vying with the others i n the pattern that has caused so much havoc in the past. It is in the Light of these soviet objectives that the Nixon Brezhnev visit should be examined and a judgment made As to whose purposes were better served the Kremlin s or our own. In one sense at least the Mere fact of superpower sum Mitry has played into russian hands by weakening the fabric of Atlantic relations. Many europeans particularly frenchmen have evoked the spectre of a new Yalta a conference in which the superpowers Settle the Fate of the world without help from the Western euro Pean nations who used to enjoy doing it themselves. No doubt they have overstated their fears that the . Would Deal with Russia in disregard of european inter ests. Yet foreign offices Are traditionally suspicious and sex Post Facto reassurances Are rarely sufficient particularly when Atlantic relations Are already strained by abrasive tradesmen s arguments Over commercial and monetary policy. Unhappily the agreements that issued from the White House contained Little sub stance to offset european worries. In some ways they merely confirmed them. Thus the agreement on the prevention of nuclear War seemed More an expression of pious sentiment than an effective deterrent to catastrophe. It reads All too much like the Kellogg Briand pact of 1928 which by its terms outlawed War As an instrument of policy while the nations of the world were preparing to fight one. So far no one has been rude enough to mention the fact that such self restraints Are already codified in the United nations charter. Nor were the guidelines for the negotiators of the so called Salt ii agreements at Geneva any Freer from piety and ambiguity they left most of the hard questions for the Green Baize table. What was made explicit was that the limitations on strategic offensive weapons might apply to their quantitative As Well As qualitative aspects which obviously has a bearing on the numerical advantage provided the soviet Union under the temporary agreement of october 1972. With regard to the question of multiple War head missiles the most difficult problem the negotiators still face soviet continued insistence that Only National Means be used for verification Means that the verification process will be effectively limited to test ing and development. The other agreements were a mixed bag negotiated in Advance of the meeting and much top limited and tech Nical to justify Summit Diplo Macy. They covered such matters As co operation in developing the peaceful use of atomic Energy in oceanography in transportation and in reciprocal taxation. Obviously one sided was an agreement for co operation o n agricultural research since the . Has the most efficient agriculture in the world while the state and collective farms in the soviet Union Are monuments to in competence and inefficiency. In his Public utterances or. Brezhnev seemed less a statesman that a travelling Salesman constantly paint ing vivid pictures of the Vir tues of Trade Between the so Viet Union and the ., while dangling before . Business the Prospect of vast deals involving the exploitation of soviet natural re sources particularly Energy. Trade Between the . And the soviet Union has Fol Lowed a curious course. For Many years conservative leaders in America regarded any Commerce with the Sovi ets with an almost theological aversion it was supping with the Devil. They justified their extreme position by the far fetched argument that Al most any Trade would help build up the soviet Economy and hence the soviet capacity for aggression in spite of the fact that Russia could procure almost everything it wanted including High technology from Europe. Today All that has under gone a quiet extraordinary reversal. Instead of Advocat ing the restriction of . So Viet Trade Many quite serious and . Businessmen Are now eager to encourage it even to the extent of pressing for Large scale government credits. The most conservative farming elements last year took no exception to massive wheat sales at Low prices made possible by govern ment subsidies even though the effect was greatly to raise the Price for the Amer ican consumer. Not Only was it Good business for the Farmers but they now see Trade As the key to peace. That or. Brezhnev is pounding the same drum sex a 11 i n g Trade As assuring peaceful relations deserves closer examination. As an abstract proposition the argument finds Little support in past experience since some of the bloodiest wars in history As for example the first world War were fought Between nations heavily dependent on Trade with one another. And As our commercial relations with Japan and Western Europe have recently shown Trade can be an irritant As much As an adhesive. Thus one May wonder whether the soviet interest in Trade with the . Is quite a s Noble As represented. Apart from the economic advantages of trading with the . The Only country Cap Able of mobilizing the Mas Sive credits they need the soviets May Well see in Trade a useful political lever. When or. Khrushchev was Here 14 years ago he eagerly sought meetings with leaders of american business and finance. He had swallowed whole the marxist doctrine that in a capitalist country business dominates politics and he seemed to accept without question that Wall Street dictates to washing ton. Thus if he could Only Lead american Bankers and businessmen to develop a vested interest in relations with the soviet Union they would in his View provide a powerful support that the Kremlin could use for its own diplomatic purposes. In other words american Busi Ness and finance were As he saw them the soft Underbelly of the american body politic which he was determined to exploit. One can detect the same operative assumptions in or. Brezhnev s whooping it up for expanded Trade As the key to soviet-. Relations. Yet. We should not be put off by our knowledge that his operative assumptions arc mistaken that Washington runs Wall Street rather than vice versa to ignore what he is seeking to achieve. All of this is not to suggest that we should hesitate to pursue trading opportunities with the soviet Union or even exploit the soviet Union As a source of needed Energy and raw materials whenever and wherever it is economically and commercially use Ful. What we should not do is Accord More governmental encouragement to Trade with the soviet Union than Trade with any other Corner of the world or put Trust in the dubious cliche that expanded Commerce can by itself pro vide the key to a More stable and peaceful world. Secretary Brezhnev and president Nixon shaking hands after signing of documents. Or. Ball was . Under Secre tary of state during the Johnson administration by Tom Lambert Dublin if the Irish Are a Puzzle even to them selves consider who the puzzling Irish recently elected As president Lor the next seven years. Erskine guilders born in England a nation sonic of his countrymen still despise a protestant in this predominantly roman Catholic state a Man who does not speak gaelic ire land s native language the son of a revolutionary anti British pro Irish Mother from the United states and and English father. Or. Childer s father was executed for insurgency on the order of an Uncle of the new president s electoral foe. The circumstances May have some aspects of a greek tragedy i suppose one might or. Childers reflected during an interview in his spa c i o White presidential mansion. But or. Child cars beamed about his election As a protestant whose fellow religionists make up Only five per cent of ire land s estimated citizens. The rest Are roman catholics. Protestant at Helm in Dublin if the election showed we irishmen arc a tolerant people then i am very he said. Adding i have never Felt the slightest discrimination a against me for my religion in All my life he s a Sood Little Man you know he did things for us As h c a 11 h minister he s honest he Speaks the truth we like said a Dublin labourer explaining Why he voted across his party s line for the new president. A graduate of Britain s Cambridge University and one time manager of an american tourist Agency office in Paris or. Childers has been an Irish Parli Centarian since 1938 and Cabinet minister of land transport and health in three Irish governments. I was Deputy prime min ister in Jack Kov Iii mint. Which was re wetly ousted by a coalition headed by am Cusp rave. Thi present prime min ister. The slight soft spoken Grey haired or. Childers limping because of a strained Achilles Tendon won the presidency in a hard fought bout with the government s candidate Thomas o Higgins. It was or. O Higgins Uncle Kevin who ordered or. Childers father executed As an insure agent in the 1922-1923 Irish civil War. That conflict featured the use of some weapons brought to Ireland by or. Childers Boston born Mother and English father aboard their sailing schoo Ner. Gazing out of his Small comfortable office across the two Lily Ponds clipped lawns and Flower Beds of h i s mansion s carefully tended formal gardens or. Childers recalled that he had been summoned to his father s cell the Day before Bis execution. The new president was then 37 old. My f a 11 c r told me never to speak of the civil War or Bis execution to hands with his cd ecu liners and to do Noth ing Ever to create bitter Ness in the pres ident said. A n d i he added. M r Childers did not mention the War or his is her s execution in the. 250 self write in speeches Cliv e r e it in his Campaign. Neither did Thomas o Hig gins. And their coun t r y m e n knowing their backgrounds did not raise those subjects. As Ireland s fourth pres ident and its second protestant chief of state the 67-year-old or. Childers does not have the High nation founding Aura of the Man he succeeded 91-year-old Eamon de Valera who is to Ireland Al most what John a. Mac Donald is to Canada. Or. Do Valera had served two terms of seven years each. Packing a curved pipe elbows on his Large presidential desk graced with one Black and two White telephones or. Childers grinned when asked How to Felt about joining the world s society of presidents. Ireland s president be explained does not have s t r o n g constitutional p o w e r s the nation is governed by its prime min Isler and parliament. The president May refer to the supreme court any parliamentary Law he deems unconstitutional and Many fall for a general election if parliamentary opposition defeats the government on a substantive Issue. But otherwise the presi Dency is largely a titular office its occupant Busy with ceremonial affairs and expected to stay out of polities. I will try to extend the president s role in a non controversial Way so As to provide improved Educa Tion and cultural opportunities for Young people to better the Quality of Irish he said. People have come too much to rely on govern ments to create their societies and that should be the function of their Citi Zens to decide the Way they shall live their social and moral he added. Convinced that the character of society is largely created by what people do in their spare or. Childers wants Ireland to avoid the ten Sions arising in sonic other slates out of boredom with work and modern living patterns. I n 1 c s s an enormous change can be made in the Cycle of social behaviour be fore the end of this Cen Tury we May have a gift Job Wilh the mental health of he said. 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