Winnipeg Free Press

Winnipeg Free Press (Newspaper) - September 21, 2021, Winnipeg, Manitoba C M Y K PAGE A7 THINK TANK PERSPECTIVES EDITOR: BRAD OSWALD 204-697-7269 ● BRAD.OSWALD@FREEPRESS.MB.CA ● WINNIPEGFREEPRESS.COM A7 TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 21, 2021 Ideas, Issues, Insights YURI GRIPAS/ABACA PRESS/TNS U.S. President Joe Biden delivers an address from the White House on Aug. 31, outlining the decision to end America’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Does Biden Doctrine make Americans safer? I T was hard not to miss. As U.S. President Joe Biden, speaking about the end of the U.S. mil-itary engagement in Afghanistan and pound- ing the podium for effect, made perfectly clear: “It was time to end this war.” Is the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan an early indication of what constitutes the Biden Doctrine? And what will it mean in terms of the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy? Almost every U.S. president outlines a national- security doctrine or set of foreign-policy precepts to guide their actions in the international arena. It is true that these doctrines convey important foreign-policy signals to the rest of the world. But they are also highly political documents meant to reassure members of Congress, the business community, civil society and the general public. The 1947 Truman Doctrine, for instance, was intended to send a powerful message to the Krem- lin. U.S. president Harry Truman wanted to offer all manner of assistance to democratic countries facing threats from internal or external commu- nist forces. U.S. president Ronald Reagan, the hawkish cold warrior, felt the need to broaden the old organiz- ing principle of “containment” of the USSR to something akin to a “rollback” strategy. That translated into confronting militarily Soviet threats (whether real or imagined) in places such as Nicaragua, Angola and even tiny Grenada. For his part, U.S. president Bill Clinton articu- lated a doctrine based on spreading or exporting U.S.-style democracy abroad or “democratic en- largement.” The underlying idea was that U.S. se- curity and economic interests would be protected if the world contained more democratic states. It was a slight revision of the whole “democratic peace” (in the globe) argument. In many ways, the nascent Biden Doctrine appears to be a full-throated repudiation of the George W. Bush Doctrine. Bush, you may recall, was a staunch advocate of flexing American military power abroad and engaging in “regime change” and “pre-emptive war” (remember Af- ghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003?). We should recall that Biden campaigned in 2020 on terminating U.S. involvement in Afghani- stan. It has been well documented by the likes of legendary Washington Post reporter Bob Wood- ward that Biden was no fan of the Afghan mis- sion more than 10 years ago, when he was Barack Obama’s vice-president. Even then, he kept pushing the U.S. military brass: “How long are we going to have to stay in Afghanistan before things get better?” In an often-defiant TV address, Biden once again did not mince his words: “I was not going to extend this forever war, and I was not extending a forever exit.” He later added, for good measure: “After 20 years of war in Afghanistan, I refused to send another generation of America’s sons and daughters to fight a war that should have ended long ago.” With respect to Biden’s new national security doctrine, one line in particular stood out: “I simply do not believe that the safety and security of America is enhanced by continuing to deploy thousands of American troops and spending bil- lions of dollars a year in Afghanistan.” Reading between the lines, it looks like a presidential pledge to disavow the use of U.S. military force to impose regime change or “to remake other countries.” Biden was adamant about reversing the trajec- tory on the misguided foreign policy course of the last two decades and “to learn from our mis- takes.” Indeed, open-ended military occupations like Afghanistan, he said, only served to weaken the U.S. against adversaries such as China and Russia. Accordingly, Biden made it very clear that there are two critical tenets of his national security policy. “First, we must set missions with clear, achievable goals — not ones we’ll never reach. And second, we must stay clearly focused on the fundamental national security interests of the United States of America,” he stated plainly. Simply put, continuing U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan does not fall within the purview of the Biden Doctrine. Promoting human rights, however, is at the centre of a Biden foreign-policy outlook. As Biden remarked: “But the way to do that is not through endless military deployments, but through diplo- macy, economic tools, and rallying the rest of the world for support.” If need be, and to advance vital U.S. national interests, “the best path to guard our safety and our security lies in a tough, unforgiving, targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror where it is today, not where it was two decades ago.” On the Afghan withdrawal itself, Biden con- cluded, “I believe this is the right decision, a wise decision, and the best decision for America.” It was clearly a speech less about placating an international audience and more for domestic political consumption. But what happens, heaven forbid, if (or when) Afghanistan goes back to an ungoverned space and becomes a safe haven for terrorist organizations wanting to do harm to America? Peter McKenna is professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown. Time running out to protect southeastern aquifer IF THERE were ever a time to call on the Mani- toba Clean Environment Commission to review the veracity of the information contained in an Environment Act Proposal (EAP) for a propo- nent’s development project, this would be the time to do so. CanWhite Sands recently submitted an EAP for its proposed extraction activities that only provides information for its first four years of operation, not for the full 24 years it intends to operate its proposed silica sand mine. In addi- tion, the company mentions but fails to include eight important mitigation plans in the EAP it has submitted for review. The company also states it intends to make alterations to its environment licence in 2025; if these requested alterations are deemed to be mi- nor, the government can simply renew the licence automatically, leaving interested parties with no means of assessing the impacts of the changes in these alteration requests. If CanWhite Sands receives an environment licence from the province based only on the cur- rent information provided, there is a very high probability it will jeopardize the source of drink- ing water for the entire region. The proposal is to extract silica sand beneath the RM of Springfield and process it at a new facility CanWhite is pro- posing to build outside Vivian, about 60 kilome- tres east of Winnipeg. The consulting firm hired by CanWhite to pre- pare its EAP has done a stellar job of understat- ing the many serious issues identified that need to be addressed before an environment licence is issued. In the first four years of operation, the compa- ny is projected to drill more than 2,000 extraction wells to suck up 1.3 million tonnes of silica sand from the sandstone aquifer. Extrapolating from its own drilling figures for the first four years, the company could be drilling upwards of 10,000 extraction wells over the 24-year period it will be operating its proposed silica sand mine. All these extraction wells may lead to a plethora of sink holes developing over time, as the layer of limestone in the carbonate aquifer over top of the cavities created by the extraction wells is not thick enough to be stable. Glacial till overlying the compromised limestone will migrate into the extraction cavities, leaving the carbonate aquifer susceptible to a host of contaminants, such as fecal matter and other harmful bacteria, which are likely to enter the aquifer from rain and snow melt runoff. It could also lead to the mixing of water between the sandstone and limestone aquifers, which is prohibited under Manitoba law. Another source of possible contamination will be by the re-injection of excess aerated water, which has been extracted along with the silica sand, back into the sandstone aquifer. Introducing aerated water back into the aquifer will mobilize sulphide in the marcasite that coats the silica sand, in the shale and the pyrite found throughout aquifer in the region. This will generate arsenic, acid, heavy metals and toxic selenium once the aquifer is re-injected with this aerated water by the company’s uncon- ventional mining method. Its EAP glosses over this issue by stating that the core log samples and sand samples that it took are low in sulphide content, but those samples are corrupted, as the samples used in its submitted hydrogeological study were left exposed to air for far too long to be of any use. CanWhite mentions that it will be installing an ultraviolet system designed to sterilize the re-injected aerated water to prevent harmful microbes from entering the aquifer. However, the UV system will be ineffective because manga- nese, iron and particulates in the water will scat- ter the UV light that is designed to sterilize these harmful microbes. Another source of potential contamination is via the slurry lines that are to be used to send the extracted silica sand and water from the wells to the processing facility. The company admits that this is potential source for contamination, and states it will mitigate this from happening by daily slurry-line site inspections. These are but a few of the 17 major issues What the Frack Manitoba has identified in a 20-page, scientific evidence-based document that we have produced, which is not likely to be reviewed by the government of Manitoba’s technical advi- sory committee because there is simply no legal requirement to do so. The RM of Springfield has identified enough concerns with this silica sand-mining project that it is now calling on the province to undertake a commission hearing to address its concerns. There is still time, at this stage of the environ- mental review process, for interested parties to request that the director of the Environment Approval Branch recommend to Manitoba’s min- ister of conservation and climate that CanWhite’s current EAP be subject to a Clean Environment Commission panel review process, to address the numerous deficiencies that have been identified. Don Sullivan is a member of What the Frack Manitoba and is the former North American co-ordinator for the Taiga Rescue Network, a one-time special adviser to the government of Manitoba, a recipient of the Queen’s Golden Jubilee medal and currently a research associate for the Canadian Centre of Policy Alternatives - Manitoba Latest deal with U.S. creates trade barriers CANADA faces new pressures on any at- tempts to ramp up international trade. In 1994, the United States, Mexico and Can- ada created a free-trade region with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Considering that the U.S. has been the largest economy in the world from 1994 to now, NAFTA was a true asset for the Cana- dian economy. It’s estimated that the “total merchandise trade between Canada and the United States has more than doubled since 1993, and has grown over nine-fold between Canada and Mexico.” However, former U.S. president Donald Trump deemed this trade deal detrimental for American jobs and wanted a renegotiation. He argued the new treaty would “create nearly 100,000 new high-paying American auto jobs, and massively boost exports for our farm- ers, ranchers and factory workers. It would also bring trade with Mexico and Canada to greater heights, with higher levels of fairness and reciprocity.” Ottawa and Mexico have accepted this renegotiation, resulting in the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), which replaced NAFTA on July 1, 2020. Large portions of CUSMA are similar to the dispositions of NAFTA. For example, the tariff-free access to the North American mar- ketplace for Canada’s export-dependent beef, pork and grain sectors, with improvements to certain elements. The new deal also raises Canada’s duty-free level from C$20 to C$150 and the sales tax increase from C$20 to C$40. However, that only applies for U.S. goods ordered online. This solution will be profitable for Canadian customers but not for Canadian retailers, es- pecially considering the strength of American digital giants. Biden is in favour of some protectionism In addition, there’s better protection for technology firms whose copyrights now extend to 70 years, up from 50 under NAFTA. Governments can no longer request source code from tech companies, and duties on elec- tronic transmissions are prohibited. However, some aspects of this new treaty show that it might be more beneficial for the U.S. than for Canada and Mexico. Developed during the trade war waged by the Trump administration, CUSMA won’t prevent protec- tionist measures such as the 10 per cent tar- iffs on aluminum and the 25 per cent tariffs on steel imposed by the Trump administration at the end of May under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. Moreover, considering that U.S. President Joe Biden is in favour of some protectionism, uncertainty remains, threatening Canadian trade. North American protectionism is reinforced through numerous clauses under CUSMA. For example, to qualify for zero tariffs, the vehicle industry must produce 75 per cent of a vehicle’s components in North America, up from the 62.5 per cent under NAFTA. And 70 per cent of the steel and aluminum used in auto production must be produced and pur- chased in North America. According to Clifford Sosnow, co-chair of Fasken’s International Trade and Investment Group, the energy space in North America will be less integrated than under NAFTA: “Under NAFTA, governments were pro- hibited from discriminating against other NAFTA party coal, uranium or petrochemical products with import or export taxes other than duties.” However, CUSMA removes this aspect. CUSMA can also hinder potential trade treaties for Canada with specific countries. Section 31.10 of the agreement says that before negotiating a free trade agreement with a “non-market country,” the nation must inform the other CUSMA countries at least three months before starting negotiations. In the United States, 11 countries meet this definition, including China. This could be problematic for potential trade agreements with Beijing, particularly for Canada. The U.S. could act as the judge of these agree- ments and place political pressure on the negotiations. CUSMA is necessary for the Canadian economy. Refusal of this trade deal may prove to be worse than signing it. With most of the NAFTA disposition preserved, it remains a good tool for trade. However, Canada must be aware that protectionism has returned and will make international trade more compli- cated and more regulated than before. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased protectionist behaviour in North America, along with the rest of the world. Canada might have a hard job defending its interests. Alexandre Massaux is a research associate with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. © Troy Media DON SULLIVAN ALEXANDRE MASSAUX PETER MCKENNA A_07_Sep-21-21_FP_01.indd A7 2021-09-20 5:05 PM ;